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Abstract 
This paper reviews some of the milestones of thinking about political radicalization, as scholars 
and security officials struggled after 9/11 to discern the precursors of terrorist violence.  Recent 
criticism of the concept of radicalization is recognized, leading to a two-pyramids model that 
responds to the criticism by separating radicalization of opinion from radicalization of action.  
Security and research implications of the two-pyramids model are briefly described, ending with 
a call for more attention to emotional experience in understanding both radicalization of opinion 
and radicalization of action.   
 
Keywords: individual radicalization, group radicalization, mass radicalization, 
radicalization, terrorism, violent extremism, political violence, two-pyramids model, lone-wolf, 
caring-compelled terrorists, disconnected-disordered terrorists. 
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After the shock of the 9/11 attacks, security officials in the U.S. struggled to understand 
the process by which individuals and groups move to terrorism.  The hope was to ‘get to the left 
of the boom”—to predict and, ideally, to prevent future attacks.  Radicalization came to be the 
word used to refer to the human developments that precede terrorist attack.  This paper aims to 
provide an overview of thinking about radicalization.  
The enormous and still expanding literature on radicalization cannot be fully represented 
here.  The first section of the paper reviews Milestone in terrorism research since the 9/11 
attacks.  Milestone were determined on the basis of contribution to psychological theorizing of 
radicalization and salience to U.S. security officials.  Salience was largely determined from the 
authors’ experience at academic and government-sponsored conferences, where certain 
contributions seemed to resonate more with security officials. Owing to limitations of space and 
knowledge, the paper focuses on radicalization to jihadi terrorism, leaving aside important work 
on right-wing and left-wing terrorism in the U.S. (e.g. Freilich, Chermak & Gruenewald, 2014; 
Taylor, Currie, & Holbrook, 2013).  
Review of the Milestones leads to recognition of challenges to the concept of 
radicalization, which are identified in the second section of the paper and addressed in the third 
section with presentation of a two-pyramids model of radicalization. Implications of the model 
for security policy and for future research are identified in the last two sections.   
Milestones in radicalization research 
The attacks of 11 September 2001 produced a spate of research on terrorism, and the Milestones 
begin from this date.  Still, it is useful to identify several earlier perspectives that set the stage for 
radicalization research.  Most notable is Crenshaw’s (1981) view of the causes of terrorism that 
distinguished individual motives and beliefs, group-level decision-making and strategy, and the 
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wider political and social context in which terrorism occurs.  This three-way distinction of 
individual, group, and mass factors is echoed in much of later research.   
Also worth noting is the decline of theorizing that explained terrorists as crazy—as 
suffering some form of diagnosable psychopathology.  Twenty years before 9/11 it was already 
recognized that pathology is no more likely among terrorists than among non-terrorists of similar 
background (Crenshaw, 1981).  Similarly it was already clear that poverty is not a useful 
explanation of radicalization: many terrorists—perhaps most of 1970s terrorists who grew out of 
student unrest—came from middle-class and professional families (Crenshaw, 1981). 
The Staircase to Terrorism (2005) 
Moghaddam (2005) offered an early metaphor of radicalization as a six-floor ever-narrowing 
stairway to terrorism.  The ground floor is perception of injustice and relative deprivation; the 
first floor is search for options; the second floor is anger at the perceived perpetrators of 
injustice; the third floor is a moral engagement that justifies terrorism; the fourth floor is joining 
a terrorist group; and the fifth and last floor is dehumanizing enemy civilians to make them 
legitimate targets of violence.   
The staircase metaphor is a stage model set at the individual level: each floor must be 
traversed to get to the next higher floor and the order of floors is fixed.  The difference between 
justifying terrorism (third floor) and joining a terrorist group (fourth floor) is the difference 
between radical opinion and radical action.  This key difference appears as just one more step in 
the staircase model. 
The Psychology of Terrorism (2005) 
Horgan’s book-length treatment of the psychology of radicalization distinguished three 
psychological issues: the psychology of becoming a terrorist, the psychology of being 
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(persevering as) a terrorist, and the psychology of disengaging from terrorism.  The second and 
third issues are beyond the scope of this review. With regard to becoming a terrorist, Horgan 
recognized the importance of the distinction between radical ideas and violent action: “In 
Northern Ireland, and even on the marches described earlier, the number of people who became 
involved in a direct way with the PIRA [Provisional Irish Republican Army] was minimal.  The 
obvious question then is why?” (p.101). 
Horgan emphasized three ideas in progression to terrorist action.  First, the progression to 
terrorism is usually gradual, from involvement in legal activism to small acts in support of 
terrorism (courier, reconnaissance) to shooting and planting bombs.  Second is “a sense of 
dissatisfaction or disillusionment with the individual’s current persona or activity” (p.103) that 
makes an individual more open to influence.  Circumstances making an individual more open to 
influence can include loss of loved ones, work, home, or way of life; these circumstances have 
been called unfreezing in social psychology, biographical availability in sociology, and cognitive 
opening in social movement theory.  Third is the idea that community support for violent action 
that affords status to militants can help motivate violence.  
These three ideas say something about the trajectory to terrorism but are perhaps yet too 
general to understand why activists and terrorists are few. Not every individual who experiences 
unfreezing in a community that gives status to militants will start down the slippery slope to 
terrorism. 
Radical Islam rising: Muslim extremism in the West (2005) 
In this book, Quintan Wiktorowicz reports his study of U.K. Muslim activist group al-
Muhajiroun and its charismatic leader Omar Bakri Mohammed.  The study was conducted in 
2002, when reaction to the 9/11 attacks made activism in support of jihad risky.   
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The study was notable for bringing a social movement perspective to understanding how 
individuals joined al-Muhajiroun.  Social movement theory (SMT) is not a single integrated 
theory but a congeries of ideas that have been found useful in understanding movements for 
liberal causes such as civil rights and feminism.  SMT includes attention to mobilizing structures, 
political opportunities, framing, and repertoires of contentious action.    
Starting from these concepts, Wiktorowicz arrived at a four-stage model of radicalization.  
First is a cognitive opening to new people and new ideas that follows experience of personal 
disconnection (unfreezing), personal grievance (discrimination), or group grievance (oppression 
of Muslims).  Second, the seeker connects with al-Muhajiroun via personal relations with 
activists, which may be either pre-existing kin or friendship connection with activists, or new 
connections developed in activist-conducted study groups, debates, and demonstrations.  Third, 
the seeker comes to accept Omar Bakri as the one legitimate authority for interpreting Islam.  
Fourth, belief in Bakri is fused with belief in Bakri’s claim that salvation depends on supporting 
jihad; activist risk-taking then becomes a rational choice to attain eternal reward.   
Like Moghaddam, Wictorowicz offers a stage theory of radicalization in which 
individuals must go through each stage in order. Also like Moghaddam, Wictorowicz gives little 
attention to the transition from radical belief to radical action.  The last stage asserts radical 
action as a rational choice, but not everyone who sees moral behavior as necessary for salvation 
does in fact commit to moral behavior.  More promising is the description of how Omar Bakri’s 
ideology and his group emerged from competition with Hizb ut-Tahrir, who do not believe that 
the time is right for jihad.  The insight that radicalization can happen in competition of groups 
within the same movement is explored more fully by della Porta in a later milestone. 
Radicalization in the West: The homegrown threat (2007) 
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New York Police Department analysts Silber and Bhatt (2007) focus on eleven jihadist plots that 
took place in the US, the UK, Canada, Australia, Spain, and the Netherlands.  These plots are 
seen as inspired but not directed by al Qaeda.  The aim of their NYPD report is to identify stages 
of radicalization prior to planning a violent act.     
Stage 1 Preradicalization is where most Western-origin terrorists are ordinary and 
unremarkable individuals before radicalization begins.  They have little if any criminal history. 
Stage 2 Self-Identification  “is the phase where individuals, influenced by both internal 
and external factors, begin to explore Salafi Islam, gradually gravitate away from their old 
identity and begin to associate themselves with like-minded individuals and adopt this ideology 
as their own.  The catalyst for this ‘religious seeking’ “is a cognitive opening or crisis, which 
shakes one’s certitude in previously held beliefs and opens an individual to be receptive to new 
world views” (p.6).  As already noted, this kind of opening has been described variously as 
unfreezing, biographical availability, and cognitive opening.  Loss of meaning and connection 
can occur with death of loved ones, loss of job or romantic partner, migration away from family 
and friends, or experience of discrimination.  But Silber and Bhatt do not specify why the seeker 
would look to religion rather than a secular ideology such as socialism or nationalism.     
Stage 3 Indoctrination “is the phase in which an individual progressively intensifies his 
beliefs, wholly adopts Jihadi-Salafi ideology and concludes, without question, that the conditions 
and circumstances exist where action is required to support and further the cause” (p.6). The 
third stage depends on the intense dynamics of a small group of like-minded individuals who 
have accepted Jihadist-Salafi justifications of violence.  Note the transition from Salafi Islam in 
Stage 2 to Jihadi-Salafi Islam in Stage 3.  It is not clear why individuals would prefer Jihadist-
Salafi ideology over the more common Salafi Islam that aims for purity and withdrawal from a 
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contaminating world.  In this quiescent version of Salafism, politics is a worldly distraction and 
killing civilians is forbidden by the Qur’an.   
Stage 4 Jihadization “is the phase in which members of the cluster accept their 
individual duty to participate in jihad and self-designate themselves as holy warriors.  
Ultimately, the group will begin operational planning for the jihad or a terrorist attack” (p.7).   
In this model of radicalization, the leap is between Stages 3 and 4—between radical 
opinion and radical action.  Unfortunately Silber and Bhatt do not have much to say about this 
crucial step; they treat the commitment to action as a natural extension of Jihadi-Salafi ideology.  
Snow and Byrd have criticized the idea of ideology as a cause, pointing to the variation and 
flexibility of ideology in different Islamic terrorist movements, and the work required to 
construct links between ideas, events, and action.   
More generally, this is a stage model very similar to the stage model advanced by 
Moghaddam (2005).  In the next milestone, Sageman provides examples of individuals who 
develop radical ideology only after joining a militant group via kin and friendship ties.  
Leaderless Jihad (2008) 
In his 2004 book, Understanding Terror Networks, Sageman used open-source material to study 
172 participants in anti-Western jihad.  As a criminologist might study “known associates,” 
Sageman was able to show family and friendship links among his cases and that these links were 
key to understanding individual trajectories to terrorist action. Sageman’s work echoes well–
established findings in Social Psychology that groups can exert social influence in individuals’ 
decision making (Myers & Lamm, 1976), risk-taking (Gardner & Steinberg, 2005), and immoral 
behavior (Zimbardo, 2007). In Leaderless Jihad, Sageman (2008) argued that the main jihadist 
threat was no longer al Qaeda but small self-radicalizing groups of Muslims in Western 
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countries—a ‘bunch of guys’ model of radicalization. 
Sageman points to four factors that come together to move Muslims in Western countries 
to terrorist violence: Seeing world events and the war on terrorism as a war on Islam; personal 
experience of discrimination while living in the West; moral outrage in response to stories, 
especially videos, of Muslims suffering from Western violence; and face-to-face or internet 
contacts that connect an individual with the means and opportunity to attack.  In discussing these 
factors Sageman emphasizes the emotional aspects of radicalization: competition for status and 
glory, anger and humiliation in reaction to perceived Western injustice to Muslims, and love for 
comrades that perhaps includes shame for doing less than those who die as martyrs. 
Bruce Hoffman (2008) has famously disagreed with Sageman’s judgment that self-
radicalizing Western Muslims are now a bigger threat than the remnants of the al Qaeda 
organization.  One does not need to determine a victor in this debate to profit by Sageman’s 
account of radicalization of Western Muslims, and to recognize that terrorists with skills honed 
in training camps associated with al Qaeda are likely capable of more deadly attacks.     
Radicalization as terror management (2009) 
One of the originators of Terror Management Theory (TMT) argues in this paper that both 
terrorist violence and government response to terrorist violence are part of how humans deal with 
the threat of mortality (Pyszczynski, Motyl & Abdolahi, 2009).  The ‘terror’ in TMT is 
existential terror: fear of dying.  A group identity can reduce this fear with the prospect of 
immortality for a good member of a group that will go forward indefinitely in time.  Threats to 
this group, especially violent attacks that kill ingroup members, thus lead to increased thoughts 
of death (mortality salience) and increased commitment to the values of the ingroup (cultural 
anxiety buffer).  The result is increased support for violence against the enemy threat. 
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Pyszcyznski et al cite research showing that increased thoughts of mortality increased Iranian 
students’ support for martyrdom missions against the U.S, and increased U.S. conservatives’ 
support for using extreme military measures such as atom bombs to kill terrorists.   
TMT is a theory that spans individual, group, and mass psychology: all those who 
identify with a group will respond to violence against that group with increased commitment to 
the group and increased support for violence against those who threaten the group.  Importantly, 
Pyszcynski et al recognize the dynamic of action and reaction that links terrorist attacks and 
government responses: 
Research is presented which suggests that many of the same psychological forces that 
lead terrorists to their violent actions also lead to counter-terrorist policies that create 
massive collateral damage.  This collateral damage appears to further escalate the cycle 
of violence and may aid the targets of those attacks in recruiting people for the terrorist 
cause (Pyszcyynski et al, 2009, p.12).  
Edge of violence (2010) 
Bartlett, Birdwell and King (2010) compared 58 al Qaeda inspired terrorists with 28 non-violent 
Muslim radicals.  In-depth profiles of convicted terrorists ‘homegrown’ in UK, Canada, 
Denmark, France and Netherlands were created from court records and news reports.   From the 
same countries 28 radical profiles were created, of whom 20 were interviewed in depth.  
Individuals designated as radicals held one or more of three opinions: desire for a Caliphate, 
desire for Sharia law, and support for Muslims fighting Western forces in Iraq.   
  Terrorists and radicals were similar in experiencing some degree of societal exclusion, 
distrust of government, hatred for foreign policy, and some disconnection from their local 
community.  Many in both groups had some sort of identity crisis. But terrorists were unique in 
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their loathing of Western society and culture, and had a simpler and shallower conception of 
Islam. Radicals were more likely than terrorists to have been involved in political protest, to have 
studied at university (and studied humanities or arts subjects) and to have been employed.  
Bartlett, Birdwell and King summarize as follows: 
Becoming a terrorist was not always a natural or linear progression from being a radical. 
Those who turned to violence often followed a path of radicalisation which was 
characterised by a culture of violence, in-group peer pressure, and an internal code of 
honour where violence can be a route to accruing status. (p. 12). 
As Freilich, Chermak & Gruenewald (2014) note, comparison of radicals and terrorists 
with the same cause can be particularly revealing about pathways to violence.  Unfortunately this 
kind of study is rare.  More common are studies looking backward, seeking common 
denominators in the histories of known terrorists.  Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman (2009), for 
instance, examined 117 ‘homegrown’ jihadist terrorists from the U.S. and U.K. and found that 
political radicalization, not religious beliefs, was the strongest commonality.  The authors 
recognize, however, that many peaceful Muslims may share the feelings of grievance against the 
West that were assessed as political radicalization in their retrospective study.  
Protecting the homeland (2010) 
Editors Fenstermacher, Kuznar, Rieger, and Speckhard (2010) provide a substantial (42 
contributions, 52 authors, 375 pages) compilation of U.S. thinking about terrorism in relation to 
three issues relating to radicalization: root causes, dynamics of Violent Non-State Actors 
(VNSAs), and ideology.  The dominant message from the editors is the complexity of 
interactions that produce and sustain terrorist violence.   
One key insight researchers have gained through studies of terrorism is that the 
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phenomenon is inherently dynamic. VNSAs undergo a dynamic life cycle, individuals 
undergo a dynamic process of radicalization, the relations between VNSA and their state 
opponents are constantly evolving, and the networks through which VNSAs operate are 
dynamically shifting (p. 13).   
Particularly notable are two contributions using polling data to understand population 
support for terrorist violence.  Rieger (Conditions that foster Violent Non-State Actors) uses 
Gallup polls from Muslim countries to argue that there are two types of Muslims who justify 
jihadist violence.  One type includes low-income individuals who see Muslims as victims of 
Western intolerance, the other type has average income but want Shari’a law to replace current 
governance that is seen as unjust and ineffective.  Harlow (Audience-centered VNSA strategic 
communications) asks about the intended and actual audiences for al-Qaeda videos, and 
distinguishes Muslim publics, existing and potential members of al-Qaeda, Western 
policymakers, and Western publics.   
In this volume, attention to the dynamics of action and reaction in conflict between 
VNSAs and states, and to the reflection of these dynamics in mass audiences, links many of the 
contributions with the social movement perspective of Wiktorowicz and della Porta.    
Friction: How radicalization happens to them and us (2011) 
McCauley and Moskalenko use case histories ranging from 19th century Russian anti-tsarist 
terrorism to 21st century al-Qaeda terrorism to identify mechanisms of radicalization operating at 
individual, group, and mass levels.  
Individual level mechanisms of radicalization include anger and revenge for harm to self 
or loved ones (Personal Grievance), outrage for injustice to a larger group or cause the 
individual cares about (Group Grievance), participation in progressively more radical acts that 
Running head: UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL RADICALIZATION 
  
13 
culminate in terrorism (Slippery Slope), helping a friend or loved one already radicalized (Love), 
risk and power seeking, especially by young males (Status Seeking), and escape from personal 
problems (Escape).   Finally, Unfreezing is a loss of social connection that opens an individual to 
new people and new ideas; it is a multiplier of the power of the other mechanisms.      
Group-level mechanisms of radicalization to action include extremity shift in likeminded 
groups (Group Polarization) and three kinds of radicalizing intergroup conflict: competition with 
state power as less committed members of the group fall away (Condensation), competition for 
the same base of support (Outbidding), and within-group competition (Fissioning).  A multiplier 
of the power of these four mechanisms is Group Isolation: cohesion and the power of group 
norms are strengthened to the extent that group members have no one else to turn to and no 
alternative group standards.    
Mass-level mechanisms of radicalization include broad public acceptance of a view of the 
enemy as inherently bad and threatening (Hate), mobilization of opinion and action by a martyr’s 
self-sacrifice (Martyrdom), and mobilization of new support for terrorism by state over-reaction 
to terrorist attack (Jujitsu Politics).  
The three levels of mechanisms are not a stage model; rather the mechanisms are nested 
such that mass level mechanisms can affect individuals and groups, and individual level 
mechanisms can affect groups and mass opinion.  It is possible to become radicalized to 
terrorism by only individual level mechanisms, as in Lone Wolf terrorism.    
Most of the mechanisms identified are associated with strong emotional experiences, 
including anger, shame, guilt, humiliation, fear, love and hate.  Finally it is important to notice 
that the individual and group level mechanisms are mechanisms of radicalization to action, 
whereas mass level mechanisms produce radicalization of public opinion. 
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Clandestine political violence (2013) 
In this book della Porta (2013) seeks common mechanisms of radicalization to violence in four 
types of underground groups: Italian and German Leftists, Italian Rightists, Basque 
Ethnonationalists, and al-Qaeda Jihadists.  Like Wiktorowicz, della Porta begins from Social 
Movement Theory, but she focuses more on the dynamics of competition and conflict between 
groups: between police and militants, and between activist factions in the same movement.    
The mechanisms identified include (pp. 284-287) escalating policing (“violence spread 
when the state was perceived to have overreacted to the emergence of protest”), competitive 
escalation (“experimentation with violent tactics emerged from attempts to outbid the other 
groups”), activation of militant networks (“Militant networks developed in small and radical 
groupings in which political commitment and friendship mutually strengthened each other ”), 
and implosion (“Once underground, clandestine organizations underwent a process of implosion 
in which interactions with the outside were reduced”).  Della Porta finds that small cells cut off 
from sympathizers become more extreme in justifying and perpetrating violence, and become 
more focused on preserving and revenging group members than on advancing their original 
cause. 
The case material linking radicalization with individual emotions (micro level) and group 
dynamics (meso level) is very rich.  Polls are cited to access the population (macro) level.  
Across the complex linkages of levels, the key insight is that radicalization occurs in the 
dynamics of action and reaction in conflicts between activists and police, and in conflicts 
between competing activist groups.  In this perspective, radicalization to violence is an emergent 
property of escalating conflict, especially when non-violent activism is suppressed or failing.    
Although in different language, the mechanisms identified by della Porta have 
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considerable overlap with the mechanisms identified by McCauley and Moskalenko.  Indeed the 
psychological nature of her analysis at individual and group levels is signaled by her attention to 
emotions, including an explicit commitment (p. 20) to the idea that emotions can be causes.  This 
idea is common in psychology but rarely accepted in political science (but see Petersen, 2011). 
Significance quest (2014) 
“The quest for significance is the fundamental desire to matter, to be someone, to have 
respect…[including] need for esteem, achievement, meaning, competence, control, and so on” 
(Kruglanski et al, 2014, p. 73).  In this perspective, more familiar terrorist motivations such as 
personal revenge, group grievance, and attachment to a charismatic leader are all special cases of 
significance quest.  When joined with a terrorism-justifying ideology and social connections 
promoting this ideology, significance quest moves an individual to radical ideas and radical 
actions. 
 The significance quest model of radicalization is intellectually ambitious in hypothesizing 
a common denominator of terrorist motivations.  At this level of generality, it is not clear how 
significance quest differs from relative deprivation theory, which predicts anger and aggression 
from individuals and groups who believe that their status is less than it should be (Gurr, 1970; 
Kruglanski et al, 2009, pp. 345-346; see also in Moghaddam’s 2005 staircase model).  For 
security officials, it may be more difficult to look for significance quest than it would be to look 
for personal and group grievances, unfreezing, and social connection with known militants.   
The radicalization puzzle (2015) 
In this paper Hafez and Mullins (2015) aim to synthesize research that can illuminate how 
Western Muslims turn to jihadi violence.  The authors begin by criticizing several terrorism 
experts for defining radicalization as a process (e.g. “the social and psychological process of 
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incrementally experienced commitment to extremist political or religious ideology”).  Hafez and 
Mullins argue that case histories of radicalization do not support the kind of orderly and linear 
progression that can be described as a process.  
 As Taylor and Horgan (2006) note, however, “To use a term like ‘process’ to describe 
activities like terrorism implies what we describe as terrorism to be actions of some kind 
associated with other actions and reactions, often expressed in some sort of reciprocal 
relationship.” This view of radicalization highlights a process of action and reaction in a dynamic 
of terrorist attack and government response to terrorism; the trajectory of this kind of dynamic is 
anything but linear and predictable. 
Nevertheless, Hafez and Mullins recognize that few with radical ideas ever move to 
violent action, and distinguish radicalization of ideas (justifying violence for a political goal) 
from radicalization of action (from legal activism to participation in terrorist attacks).  They 
suggest that four factors (‘pieces of the puzzle’) have to come together to produce terrorist 
action: grievance, networks, ideology, and enabling environment.  Western Muslims have 
grievances relating to discrimination and foreign policies.  Mobilization to action most often 
occurs through friendship and family connections.  Ideology, including religion, provides a 
toolkit for constructing a social movement frame that justifies use of violence.  Enabling 
environment includes Internet connections and training camps.   
The four pieces of the puzzle advanced by Hafez and Mullins have much in common 
with Sageman’s (2008) four radicalization factors.  Like Sageman, Hafez and Mullins mostly 
focus on radicalization in a small group or radicalization to join an existing terrorist group.  The 
power of group dynamics is recognized in citing important work by Hafez showing that the great 
majority of foreign fighters going to Iraq made the journey in small groups.  But neither of these 
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four-factor models have much to say about lone-wolf terrorists, who do not act as part of a group 
and have no connections with a militant group or its training camps.   
What’s wrong with radicalization (and extremism)? 
Beginning around 2010, a number of thoughtful scholars have raised doubts about the usefulness 
of the concept of radicalization.  This section briefly recognizes these concerns and related 
concerns about the concept of extremism, then offers a two-pyramids model as remedy. 
Eliding radical ideas and radical actions 
It is useful to begin with an extended statement of misgivings from Horgan. 
When terrorism became too difficult to predict, we turned our focus to radicalization. 
After all, a lot more people are radicalized than will ever become involved in terrorism, 
so, the assumption goes, it is easier to detect radicalized individuals. Rooting out 
radicalization has become a proxy for pre-empting terrorism. 
But this logic, compelling as it was, faces some serious obstacles. It appears to be 
generally accepted wisdom that not everyone who holds radical beliefs will engage in 
illegal behavior. Though the consequences of terrorist atrocities are far-reaching, they 
continue to be perpetrated by very few individuals. […] 
However, a more challenging issue has begun to emerge. There is evidence that not all 
those who engage in violent behavior necessarily need to possess radical beliefs, an 
argument carefully supported by such research as that of Kilcullen's thesis on how 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism breed 'accidental' guerillas. A lingering question 
in terrorism studies is whether violent beliefs precede violent action, and it seems to be 
the case that while they often do, it is not always the case. (Horgan, 2012, para 5-7). 
Horgan cites similar concerns expressed by Githens-Mazer (2010), Sedgewick (2010), and 
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(with regard to insurgency) Kilcullen (2009).   
Similar concerns have also been expressed by Kundnani (2015) and Patel (2011).in 
relation to UK counter-extremism programs. 
The December 2013 report of the Prime Minister’s Task Force on Tackling 
Radicalisation and Extremism illustrates that there remains an assumption that al-Qaeda-
inspired terrorism is caused by particular kinds of religious ideology, what it calls a 
“poisonous extremist ideology that can lead people to violence.” The report also makes 
clear that the government remains committed to the development of policies that seek to 
reduce terrorism by preventing extremist ideology from circulating and intervening in the 
lives of those who have adopted it. (Kundnani, 2015, p.11) 
 The challenge being raised against radicalization and extremism is that these concepts 
elide ideas and action.  A popular image of this elision is that radical ideology is a ‘conveyor 
belt’ that mechanically moves an individual on to violent action (Baran, 2005).  As the critics 
point out, seeing ideas as the threat leads to a war on ideas.  Targeting ideas is likely to produce a 
backlash, as happened with U.S. Muslim groups rising to oppose the (now delayed) FBI website 
designed to help teachers and students identify individuals flirting with violent extremism 
(Goodstein, 2015).   As several Milestone authors have recognized, government over-reaction to 
terrorist threat (collateral damage, escalated policing, jujitsu politics) can create new threats  
The two-pyramids model 
What is to be done?  Getting rid of the words radicalization and extremism will not help; new 
names would soon arise to refer to the mechanisms by which individuals, groups, and mass 
opinion are moved to support or participate in political violence.  More useful is recognizing that 
radicalization to extremist opinions is psychologically a different phenomenon from 
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radicalization to extremist action.  As Borum (2011, p.30) has argued,“Radicalization—the 
process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs—needs to be distinguished from action 
pathways—the process of engaging in terrorism or violent extremist actions.”    
 Research in Social Psychology has long established that attitudes do not easily translate 
to actions. In a seminal review of literature on the relationship between attitude and behavior 
Wicker (1969) noted, “Taken as a whole, these studies suggest that it is considerably more likely 
that attitudes will be unrelated or only slightly related to overt behaviors than that attitudes will 
be closely related to actions” (p. 65).  
The weak relation between attitude and behavior is especially evident with attitudes 
relating to extreme behaviors. About 45% of college students report suicidal thoughts, yet only 
five percent ever attempt suicide (Rudd, 1989). Similarly, most people have homicidal fantasies 
at some point in their lives, and as many as 91% of all surveyed college students report 
homicidal thoughts (Duntley, 2005). Yet, mercifully, only a small minority ever act on these 
fantasies. Likewise, anger about group discrimination rarely translates into protests 
(Klandermans, 1997). Consistent with research on attitude and behavior, the two-pyramids 
model of radicalizations represents radicalization of opinion separately from radicalization of 
action (Leuprecht, Hataley, Moskalenko & McCauley, 2010; McCauley, 2013; McCauley & 
Moskalenko, 2014). 
 Opinion pyramid. At the base of this pyramid are individuals who do not care about a 
political cause (neutral); higher in the pyramid are those who believe in the cause but do not 
justify violence (sympathizers); higher yet those who justify violence in defense of the cause 
(justifiers); and at the apex of the pyramid those who feel a personal moral obligation to take up 
violence in defense of the cause. This is not a stairway model: individuals can skip levels in 
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moving up and down in the pyramid. 
Polling data can put percentages on the levels of the opinion pyramid. Over half of 
Muslims in the U.S. and U.K. believe that the war on terrorism is a war on Islam; these are 
sympathizers with the jihadi terrorist cause. At least five percent of Muslims in the U.S. and 
U.K. see suicide bombing of civilians in defense of Islam as often or sometimes justified. This 
five percent justifying violence projects to about 50,000 adult Muslims in both U.S. and U.K.—
underlining the potential danger of backlash in targeting those with extreme opinions.   
Empirical studies using opinion polls of U.S. Muslims demonstrate the usefulness of the 
opinion pyramid. Plotting along the layers of the pyramid percent of respondents who agree with 
least radical statements to most radical statements on the survey allows researchers to track 
changes in radicalization of opinion in a particular group over time or in reaction to a political 
event (McCauley, 2013). 
Action pyramid.  At the base of this pyramid are individuals doing nothing for a political 
group or cause (inert), higher in the pyramid are those who are engaged in legal political action 
for the cause (activists), higher yet those engaged in illegal action for the cause (radicals), and at 
the apex of the pyramid those engaged in illegal action that targets civilians (terrorists). Again 
this is not a stairway model; individuals can skip levels in moving up and down in the action 
pyramid.   
Research using a scale that measures activist intentions (legal, non-violent actions) and 
radical intentions (illegal, violent actions) found that these were distinct dimensions which 
correlated differentially with past activism and past radicalism, as well as with measures of 
importance of country, ethnicity and political party (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009). Thus there 
is some empirical support to the distinction between the second (activists) and third (radicals) 
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levels of the action pyramid. 
A recent study offered a creative way to study the relationship between the two pyramids 
of radicalization. The authors categorized fifteen extremist group, based on their history of 
violent action, as activists, radicals, or terrorists. The content of their Internet websites was then 
coded on extremity of opinion. These ratings were plotted against groups’ level of violent action. 
Results show little difference between activist and radical groups but a significant difference 
between radical and terrorist groups in greater power motive and less cognitive complexity in 
terrorist groups (Suedfeld, Cross & Logan, 2013).  
As several Milestone authors have noted, jihadist actors are few--perhaps hundreds in 
U.S. or U.K.--in comparison with tens of thousands with radical opinions.  And many individuals 
move to jihadist action without jihadist ideas—for personal revenge, status, escape, or love.  The 
warrant for the two-pyramids model is the observation that ninety-nine percent of those with 
radical ideas never act. Conversely, many join in radical action without radical ideas: among the 
mechanisms in McCauley and Moskalenko’s Friction, four individual level mechanisms (Love, 
Risk and Status, Slippery Slope, Unfreezing) and three group-level mechanisms (Polarization, 
Competition, Isolation and threat) can bring radical action in the absence of radical ideas.   
Lone-wolf terrorists 
Lone-wolf terrorists are a potential challenge to the two-pyramids model. If an individual does 
not join a terrorist group, and acts without group support, it might appear that lone-wolf terrorists 
are indeed cases where radical opinion directly produces radical action.  
 The first thing to note is that lone-wolf terrorists are rare, and may be the rare exceptions 
that tests the limits of the two-pyramids rule. More substantively, there may be two types of 
lone-wolf terrorist: the disconnected-disordered and the caring-compelled (McCauley & 
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Moskalenko, 2014). 
Disconnected-disordered lone-wolf terrorists are like school attackers and assassins, 
who are predominantly lone actors, in showing five common characteristics: a grievance, planful 
rather than impulsive attack, weak social ties (‘loners’), mental health problems (especially 
depression), and experience with weapons outside the military.  A prominent example of this 
type is The Unabomber, Theodore Kaczynski. These common characteristics suggest that 
disconnected-disordered lone-wolf terrorists may be part of a larger phenomenon of lone-actor 
perpetrators of planful violence who have little to lose in escaping the pain of depression and 
loneliness.  It may be only the accident of how an individual describes his grievance that 
determines whether the attacker is called terrorist or assassin or school attacker.   
Whether or not research finds a way to distinguish the psychology of lone-wolf terrorists 
from that of school attackers and assassins, the disconnected-disordered type is consistent with 
the two-pyramids model.  This type moves to violence not only from radical ideas of grievance 
but from elements of unfreezing, escape, and status seeking (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014).  
Caring-compelled lone-wolf terrorists are normal, socially connected and even 
idealistic individuals who feel an unusual degree of sympathy for victims of injustice; their 
feelings push them toward a personal moral obligation to bring justice to the perpetrators.  An 
example of this type is anti-abortion terrorist Clayton Waagner, who shut down abortion 
facilities across the U.S.—twice—with anthrax threats (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011, Chapter 
3). In Waagner’s case, the move to radical action occurred in a moment of strong emotion, as he 
held the tiny body of his stillborn grand-daughter and thought of all the similar bodies lost to 
abortion.  
Individuals of this type may be rare in having an excess of what is usually accounted a 
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virtue: sympathy.  Rare or not, caring-compelled lone-wolf terrorists do represent a challenge to 
the two-pyramids model, and sympathy-induced outrage may be only one of the emotions that 
can push radical opinions to radical action.  The next section returns to the importance of 
emotions. 
Here it is important to note that individuals may have radical opinions for a long period 
of time before turning to violent action.  Humam al-Balawi, the suicide bomber who attacked the 
CIA base in Khost, Afghanistan, was breathing jihadist fire on the Internet for months but did 
nothing until Jordanian intelligence sent him to Pakistan (Turcan & McCauley, 2010). Analysts 
usually look at motivation to assess risk of terrorist activity, but means and opportunity may be 
more useful for understanding why only a few with radical opinions ever get to radical action.  
Implications of the two-pyramids model 
Taken together, the two pyramids are an antidote to eliding radical opinion with radical action, 
and to eliding extremist opinion with extremist violence.  Rather than theorizing “radicalization” 
it is necessary to separately theorize radicalization of opinion and radicalization of action.  
In February 2015 the White House convened a three-day Summit on Countering Violent 
Extremism.  A December 2015 Google search for ‘countering violent extremism (CVE)” 
produced 371,000 hits, and it is clear that CVE has become the predominant framing of U.S. 
response to terrorist threats. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security defines violent 
extremists as “individuals who support or commit ideologically-motivated violence to further 
political ends” (DHS, 2015). This definition assumes that terrorist violence is ideologically 
motivated—emotional reactions are off the table. A motive as simple as revenge for perceived 
Western humiliation of Muslims (Khouri, 2015) is not conceivable under this definition.  The 
DHS definition also conflates support for political violence with committing radical violence—
Running head: UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL RADICALIZATION 
  
24 
multiplying the enemy, as noted above, by a hundred.     
In short, the words and concepts used by the U.S. government to describe extremists and 
to frame reactions to their threat—language now dominant in the U.S. government--works 
against separating radicalization of opinion from radicalization of action. The language that 
focuses on Islamic Extremism and Violent Extremism as the enemy is a major impediment to the 
theoretical separation between radicalization in opinion and action.   
A modest suggestion to forward this separation is so simple that it may be practical:  to 
rename Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) as Countering Extremist Violence (CEV).   
In the pages of American Psychologist it will perhaps seem odd that the distinction 
between attitude and behavior featured in every psychology textbook has not been obvious in 
efforts to understand terrorist violence.  The textbook lesson is that the relation of attitude and 
behavior is generally weak--weakened by the power of ‘other variables’ such as norms, habits, 
and perceptions of control.  Consistent with this lesson, radical opinions are neither necessary 
nor sufficient for terrorist violence. 
Security implications of the two-pyramids model 
This section draws out a few implications of the two-pyramids model for security officials 
responsible for counter-terrorist strategy and tactics. 
There is no ‘‘conveyor belt’’ from extreme beliefs to extreme action. It is plausible 
that radical beliefs inspire radical action, but research indicates that the connection is weak. Bad 
ideas are not like a dose of salts that must produce bad actions.  
Fighting extreme ideas requires different skills than fighting terrorists. 
Radicalization of opinion is a phenomenon of mass psychology, whereas radicalization of action 
is a phenomenon of individual and small-group psychology.  Fighting these two kinds of 
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radicalization requires different tools and different skills.  One might argue, for instance, that the 
U.S. State Department could be more effective in the War of Ideas; whereas the police, the FBI, 
and the Defense Department might be more useful in finding and fighting terrorists. 
Less can be more.  Escalated policing can produce escalated terrorist violence and 
escalated sympathy and support for terrorist violence.  Responding to the November 2015 attacks 
inspired by Islamic State, the French Parliament decreed a state of emergency: “All over France, 
from Toulouse in the south to Paris and beyond, the police have been breaking down doors, 
conducting searches without warrants, aggressively questioning residents, hauling suspects to 
police stations and putting others under house arrest” (Nossiter, 2015).  The targets of this 
escalated policing are predominantly Muslims, giving Islamic State the jujitsu politics it hopes 
will convince Muslims all over Europe—20 million Muslims--that their future is with IS.   
Fewer enemies is better. Targeting radical or extremist ideas is another kind of success 
for jujitsu politics.  Perhaps the most dangerous force for hostility and discrimination against 
Muslims is the definition of the enemy as "fundamentalist Muslims." Marine LePen, leader of an 
anti-immigrant party in France, offered this target in an interview with NPR's Robert Siegel: 
"...we must eradicate Islamic fundamentalism from our soil."  As noted earlier, targeting ideas 
rather than actions multiplies the enemy by a hundred.   
Lessons from counterinsurgency. Here it is useful to note the strong parallel between 
counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency.  The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency 
Field Manual (2006) gives close attention to the insurgent strategy that aims to mobilize new 
support by eliciting government overreaction to insurgent attacks.  The need to counter this 
strategy of jujitsu politics comes through in the first five Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency 
Operations (pp. 47-51).   
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(1) Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be. (2) 
Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is. (3) The more successful the 
counterinsurgency is, the less force can be used and the more risk must be accepted. (4) 
Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. (5) Some of the best weapons for 
counterinsurgents do not shoot.   
Insurgency and terrorism are forms of political conflict.  Counterinsurgency and counterterrorism 
are thus forms of political conflict.  Mao Zedong’s slogan is perhaps the shortest summary of the 
road to success for both counterinsurgency and counterterrorism: “Politics takes command.”  
Research implications of the two-pyramids model 
Separating radicalization of ideas from radicalization of action can open new research directions 
for both pyramids.  
Ideas vs. Actions. The two-pyramids model leads immediately to the question of why 
and how some groups move to violent action while other groups with the same goals do not.  An 
outstanding example of the kind of research needed is a project that brought multiple 
investigators and multiple content coding systems to a comparison of the rhetoric used by two al-
Qaeda groups and two non-violent groups with similar ideology and goals (Smith, 2013).  Larger 
scale comparisons of this kind may be possible with conflict databases such as MAROB 
(Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior), that include both violent and nonviolent groups.  
Behavioral trajectories. Liberated from a supposed common grounding in radical ideas, 
research on radicalization to terrorist violence can focus on different behavioral trajectories. 
There seem to be at least five trajectories of radicalization to terrorist action.  1) An individual 
can move to political violence alone, without group or organizational support (lone wolf).   2) An 
individual can move to violence by joining an already violent group (ISIS volunteers).  3) An 
Running head: UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL RADICALIZATION 
  
27 
individual can move to violence by volunteering as a suicide bomber for an already violent group 
(al Balawi’s attack on the CIA at Khost). 4) A small and isolated group can move to political 
violence (Sageman’s bunch of guys). 5) A small group within a larger activist movement can 
move to violence as part of intergroup competition (condensation, outbidding, or fission).  
Research might aim to test the possibility that the psychologies associated with these five 
trajectories are different; it is even possible that there are different personality and demographic 
profiles associated with these trajectories.  More confidently one can predict that group-level 
mechanisms of radicalization to action will be stronger for the last two trajectories, which focus 
on group dynamics and intergroup conflict.   
Emotions in ideas and actions. Case histories of terrorists show them in the grip of 
anger, outrage, shame, humiliation and feeling the extreme forms of positive and negative 
identification that are commonly called love and hate (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011; 
Royzman, McCauley & Rozin, 2004). Psychologists, especially those familiar with appraisal 
theories of emotion (Frijda, Kuipers, & Ter Schure, 1989), have a head start in seeing the 
possibility that emotion includes an impetus to action. New databases with increasing detail 
about individual offenders--American Terrorism Study (ATS), U.S. Extremist Crime Database 
(ECDB), and Profiles in Individual Radicalization in the U.S. (PIRUS) offer the possibility of 
learning more about the emotional experiences associated with different levels of both 
radicalization of ideas and radicalization of action. In particular it seems possible that similar 
emotions are at work in moving individuals to both legal political activism and terrorist violence.   
 Polling research. Trends in public opinion relating to terrorism also need research.  With 
regard to seeing the war on terrorism as a war on Islam, or seeing suicide bombing as justified in 
defense of Islam, how do U.S. Muslims differ from Muslims in predominantly Muslim 
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countries?  How do these opinions differ for Muslims coming to the U.S. from different origin 
countries?  What distinguishes the minority of U.S. Muslims who see suicide bombing as 
justified from the majority who say it is never justified?   
 Public opinion among those targeted by terrorists also needs study. An innovative study 
by Back, Kufner, and Eglof (2010) examined emotion words in millions of words of texts sent in 
the United States on September 11, 2001. Anger- related words increased throughout the day, 
ending six times higher than fear- and sadness- related words. In addition, experiments have 
found that U.S. students responding to images of the 9/ 11 attacks with anger are more likely to 
favor aggressive reactions to terrorism, whereas reactions of fear and sadness are related to 
support for more defensive reactions (Wetherell et al, 2013).  
 Understanding radicalization of public opinion on both sides of intergroup conflict can 
profit by greater attention to psychological research on group-based emotions (Mackie, Devos & 
Smith, 2000), especially moral emotions (Rozin, Lowery, Imada & Haidt, 1999).  Matsumoto, 
Hwang & Frank (2012) have pointed to the potential of this kind of research, implicating the 
importance of anger, fear, shame, and disgust.  Studies by Matsumoto and his colleagues have 
shown, for instance, that speeches of world leaders and ideological group leaders show increased 
anger, contempt, and disgust before initiating acts of aggression toward perceived enemies.   
Looking forward 
Although a rational choice framework still dominates research on terrorism, there is growing 
awareness of the importance of emotions and affective experience in understanding political 
radicalization.  Psychologists and psychological research are poised to bring a revolution in 
understanding both radicalization of opinion and radicalization of action.   
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